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Respecting Dissent:
Justice Ginsburg’s Critique of the  
Troubling Invocation of Appearance
Laurence H. Tribe
Carl M. Loeb University Professor
Justice Ginsburg is alone on the Court in resisting the pro forma flourish 
of declaring respect for majority opinions that she carefully demolishes, 
but she neither shrinks from voicing dissent nor does so casually. It is 
the care with which she decides when to disagree, and the precision with 
which she expresses disagreement, that bespeaks the respect for her col-
leagues and the institution that others sometimes honor only in form. I 
focus here on Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in two cases, Baze v. Rees and 
Gonzales v. Carhart, to show how she selects and frames her departures 
from majority judgments. My aim is to expose the way the majorities in 
this pair of cases too casually invoked appearances to justify their hold-
ings—and the way Justice Ginsburg used her role as a dissenter to under-
mine the legitimacy of that reckless judicial methodology.
  Baze, as Justice Ginsburg forcefully demonstrates, indefensibly cast 
aside the availability of alternative lethal injection monitoring procedures 
as a relevant factor in Eighth Amendment analysis.4 And Carhart, as she 
makes plain, departed without justification from the Court’s previously 
consistent demand, rooted in “a woman’s autonomy to determine her 
life’s course,” that a health exception be included in any abortion restric-
tion.5 In both cases, a particularly troubling feature of the majority’s con-
clusion was a much too casual willingness to sacrifice important rights for 
the sake of preserving appearances.
  Regulation for the sake of appearances occupies a place of great com-
plexity in constitutional discourse. So, for instance, the way government 64
labels some conduct as criminal might do constitutionally cognizable 
harm by stigmatizing some groups in society for no better reason than 
that it deems them less worthy than others.6 Or, the way government 
elevates some symbols for public celebration might offend constitutional 
principles by signaling its endorsement of certain religious beliefs.7 More 
rarely, otherwise problematic government actions might be saved by at-
tention to how things appear—like insisting on a jury trial for a defendant 
whose unpopularity might have made a bench trial fairer,8 or restricting 
the role of money in politics to avoid the self-reinforcing impression that 
those who wield political power depend more on their funders than on 
their constituents.9
  But such appearance-based defenses are uniquely difficult to corrobo-
rate and uniquely tempting to accept. Lest they become trumps too easily 
played in constitutional argument, courts must scrutinize their deploy-
ment with great care to ensure that they are not just post hoc rational-
izations or excuses for deceiving the public0 and do not in fact serve to 
conceal serious constitutional violations.
  Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in Carhart and Baze represent small—but 
important—steps in developing such scrutiny of appearance-based argu-
ment. In Baze, the Court had accepted the state’s defense of including a 
new drug in its lethal injection protocol despite the drug’s risk of inflict-
ing immense pain unless properly administered, because the drug sup-
pressed involuntary movements and, therefore, preserved the “dignity” of 
the procedure while ensuring that viewers would not erroneously mistake 
spasms for signs of pain. But of course those spasms could instead accu-
rately signal excruciating suffering, and in any event, as Justice Ginsburg 
noted in her meticulous dissent, the appearance argument provided no 
excuse for failing to employ various safety checks to protect against mis-
takes if the drug was to be used at all.
 In  Carhart, the Court rested in part on the degree to which the “partial 
birth” abortion procedure Congress outlawed resembled infanticide and 
might thus jeopardize public confidence in the medical community.4 
Not only was this appearance argument hard to test empirically but, as 65
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, not even Congress had treated it 
as weighty enough to justify overriding constitutional rights: other late-
term methods of terminating pregnancy by delivering an intact fetus that 
appear no less brutal had been left untouched.5
  Few will remember the Court’s partial reliance upon appearance jus-
tifications in Baze and Carhart without recalling their gripping and pre-
cise refutation in Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinions. By depriving 
defenses based on appearances of the cumulative weight of unexamined 
endorsement, Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in this pair of life-and-death 
cases demonstrate the quiet power of cautious dissent.
m
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